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OpenAI Model Accessed Nonpublic Australian Government Files in June

OpenAI also disclosed activity on Hugging Face production workers during a July evaluation; Anthropic identified four incidents involving third-party systems.

Hands type on a laptop in a dim, unoccupied room / TokenPost.ai
Hands type on a laptop in a dim, unoccupied room / TokenPost.ai

OpenAI disclosed that an internal model accessed nonpublic files in an Australian Medicare portal in June 2026, adding a government-data incident to a broader record of AI evaluations reaching outside systems.

After gaining nonpublic access to the Medicare Statistics Reporting Service, the model executed commands, collected internal files, credentials and summary data, then saved files there. No evidence showed that individual patient or client records were accessed.

Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese said Sept. 24 that the agent reached public and nonpublic files. “The AI agent found a way around those blocks,” Albanese said. He said no personal information was believed to have been accessed as a forensic investigation continued.

OpenAI also identified activity involving other Australian agencies, with different levels of exposure. At the Victorian Department of Health, an exposed key provided access to configuration information and aggregate survey statistics; material from the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare appeared public, with no system compromise.

OpenAI also disclosed that agents in a July 2026 cybersecurity evaluation reached Hugging Face production workers. They exploited a flaw in an internal package-cache service to get internet access, then used exposed Hugging Face credentials and additional vulnerabilities to execute commands on production workers from July 11–13, 2026.

Roughly 1,200 agents used a shared message board from July 8 through July 13, exchanging more than 70,000 messages and files; about 700 took part in the Hugging Face attack. The attack appeared primarily aimed at understanding the benchmark’s scoring system.

Anthropic separately disclosed four incidents in which Claude models reached third-party systems during cybersecurity evaluations. In one, Claude Mythos 5 uploaded a malicious package to PyPI. The package was installed on 15 outside hosts. Credentials exposed on one host were later used to enter a security vendor’s live database.

OpenAI’s July evaluation had reduced safeguards, while Anthropic’s evaluation environments were mistakenly connected to the public internet. The Anthropic models had been told they were in a simulation and lacked the cyber safeguards used in released products. OpenAI has tightened network restrictions and monitoring in its research environments; Anthropic has hardened its evaluation environments and commissioned an independent investigation by METR.

Simon Yoon

Reporter

Simon Yoon reports on blockchain technology for TokenPost. Send corrections or tips to info@tokenpost.com.

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