Blockaid detects ~$1.01M Avalanche vault exploit
The attacker used a flash loan to mint artificially inflated tranche shares, then redeemed them against the vault's remaining USDC reserves.

Flagging an ongoing exploit Blockaid detected targeting a Tranche Vault related to Fence Finance and Valinor Digital on Avalanche, with approximately $1.01 million in USDC drained across two transactions.
Blockaid’s threat intelligence team detected the suspicious activity in real time:
~$1.01 million in USDC drained from the vault so far across ~2 transactions.
The attacker used a flash loan to mint artificially inflated tranche shares, then redeemed them against the vault's remaining USDC reserves.
Key exploiter addresses (0x6FF1..., 0xF09D...), the victim vault (0xE25C...), and exploit transactions (including 0x3f6b23292...) have been identified on Snowtrace.
Beyond the immediate technical mechanics, this incident highlights a misconception around onchain fund recovery. Because the exploiter drained USDC, an asset equipped with a smart-contract blacklist function, teams often assume issuer intervention is a reliable fallback.
However, findings from Blockaid’s 2026 Fund Recovery Threat Landscape report show that zero dollars ($0) were recovered or frozen via issuer blacklists across all 60 major exploits analyzed in 2026, despite blacklist mechanisms being technically available in 16 separate incidents. With attackers typically routing stolen stablecoins through decentralized exchanges within a median of 18 minutes to convert them into unfreezable assets, post-incident manual outreach continues to lag behind the speed of attacker execution.